In this paper we study a new problem of online discovering diffusion provenances in large networks. Existing work on network diffusion provenance identification focuses on offline learning where data collected from network detectors are static and a snapshot of the network is available before learning. However, an offline learning model does not meet the need for early warning, real-time awareness, or a real-time response to malicious information spreading in networks. To this end, we propose an online regression model for real-time diffusion provenance identification. Specifically, we first use offline collected network cascades to infer the edge transmission weights, and then use an online l 1 non-convex regression model as the identification model. The proposed methods are empirically evaluated on both synthetic and real-world networks. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model.
Introduction
In recent years, information diffusion in large networks has attracted much attention. The spread of malicious information such as viruses, spams and rumors has made various networks vulnerable to privacy attacks, viral advertising, etc. To stop the propagation of malicious information, researchers have recently proposed several models to identify the diffusion provenances in large networks. Online diffusion provenance discovery is also a significant presence on social networks in business. No matter how small, medium or large a business is, a brand's health and reputation is often defined by the information diffused in social media. While fake reviews or deceptive messages, spread by malevolent people, in social media are inevitable, they may cause damage to a brand's reputation or corporation's reputation as a whole. A recent study, Spam Trends in Today's Business World [1] , reported that the productivity cost of malicious information to European companies was an estimated US$2.8 billion, while US-based companies reported a loss of US$20 billion. According to The Washington Post , 1 on Tuesday, April 24, 2013, a single hoax message sent via Twitter erased $200 billion from the US stock market in 2 minutes. In cases like these, locating and severing the provenances of the diffusion in a timely manner is critical.
A false rumor ( i.e., a libelous statement) about the financial performance of a firm may be spread by market manipulators to influence the price of the firm's stock, resulting in fines from regulators or data protection enforcement agencies. While legal recourse exists for victims of libel, law enforcement agencies still need to identify the original source of the rumor and those who spread it. If the perpetrators are anonymous, tracing the IP address and identities of the individual profiles carrying or linking to the opinion piece becomes significantly more difficult and time-consuming.
Existing diffusion provenance identification models can be roughly categorized into two classes: snapshot-based provenance identification [2, 3] and detector-based identification [4] [5] [6] . Snapshot-based methods operate on the assumption that a snapshot of the entire network can be obtained and provenances can be estimated under stochastic propagation models such as the SI [7] and SIR [8] models. Although these methods have shown promising results in experiments, fetching a snapshot of the entire network is very expensive, if not impossible. Detector-based methods assume that only a small subset of nodes in a network can be monitored, and provenances can be inferred from the observations (samples) of these detectors. This group of methods has recently attracted increasing attention due to its potential for use in real-world applications.
However, to the best of our knowledge, most existing work on the diffusion provenance locating problem falls into the category April 21, 2014 . The x axis is the time and the y axis is the total number of tweets including the rumor. of offline identification, where the data are assumed to be static and available all the time. In fact, for time-critical security monitoring applications, it is necessary to unveil a diffusion provenance as soon as an observation arrives to enable early warning, realtime awareness, and a real-time response to prevent malicious information from spreading. For example, Fig. 1 shows the propagation of the rumor of "Malaysian Flight 370 has been found" on Twitter. The rumor was retweeted more than 3,500 times in a single day (March 24) . It can be seen that this rumor was propagated to a large population in a very short time. Hence, it is imperative to detect a rumor's provenance promptly. Motivated by the urgent demand for real-time and continuous diffusion provenance detection in networks, we propose to use regression learning as the basic detection model. Regression learning is favorable for real-time applications because of the freely available prior distribution. Fig. 2 shows a network propagation with only one provenance S 0 . We extract a propagation path with seven nodes { S 0 , · · · , S 6 }. Assume that we are able to observe nodes S 2 and S 4 (detectors). The two nodes are activated at time points t * + τ and t * + 2 τ respectively. The goal is to use the least square regression to minimize the error rate between the observed time delay and the estimated time delay . Assume at time t i ∈ T = [ t * , t * + 3 τ ] , the i th node is observed. At any time t i , we have, min
, where x ∈ R 7 is the target variable with element x i denoting the probability that node i is the diffusion provenance, a i ∈ R 7 is a column vector with element a ij denoting the propagation path length from the detector i to the j th node, e.g.,
The objective function is convex and non-negative and achieves its minimum value 0
In offline detection, since data from both nodes S 2 and S 4 are known, we can obtain the result as x = (1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0) T , which correctly indicates that S 0 is the diffusion provenance. However, in online detection, we first estimate x by observing data only from detector S 2 and the result is (0, 0.8, 0, 0.2, 0, 0, 0) T . When data from S 4 arrive, the result of x is updated to (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) T . We can see that an online algorithm demands dynamic and continuous computation of x , and the result of online learning is expected to approximate (or equal) the offline result.
Compared to offline identification methods, online identification models have the following challenges:
• Challenge 1: how to design an online identification model? The online identification model needs to address five questions, the unknown number of diffusion provenance k , both activated and inactivated detectors, the unknown initial propagation time t * , the uncertain propagation path, and the uncertain propagation time delay. The unknown number of diffusion provenance k indicates a sparse solution of x . Both activated and inactivated detectors lead to partially labeled data and a non-convex objective function. The uncertain propagation path and propagation time delay demand an aggregate Gaussian distribution to describe the estimated propagation time delay.
• Challenge 2: how to design a stochastic learning algorithm to solve the online identification model? Because the detectors are activated sequentially, and a decision needs to be made once a detector is activated, the algorithm needs to digest data in a continuous and converging way. Ideally, the results of the online algorithm approximate those of the offline algorithms.
• Challenge 3: how to evaluate the performance of the proposed online identification method? Given the unique characteristics of the problem, various data are demanded to evaluate performance.
In this paper, we propose a new online regression learning model to identify diffusion provenances in large networks. To solve Challenge 1 , we use an l 1 non-convex regression learning model built upon an aggregate Gaussian propagation time delay, where the network transmission weights are inferred a prior from offline collected cascades. To tackle Challenge 2 , we present an Online Stochastic Sub-gradient (OSS) algorithm that can converge to local minima. Also, we evaluate the model using four synthetic network data to address Challenge 3 .
The contributions of the work are twofold:
• We present a new online regression learning model to identify diffusion provenances in large networks. The proposed model can handle the issues of the unknown number of diffusion provenances k , the partially activated detectors, the unknown initial propagation time t * , the uncertain propagation path, and the uncertain propagation time delay.
• We present an online stochastic algorithm to solve the proposed online regression learning model. The algorithm uses a stochastic sub-gradient descent algorithm to continuously detect the provenances.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys related work. Section 3 introduces the related preliminaries. The regression learning and online algorithm are given in Sections 4 and 5 respectively. Section 6 empirically evaluates the algorithms. We conclude the paper in Section 7 .
Related work
Malicious information, such as rumors and viruses, that propagate in networks, which result in privacy and security concerns [9, 10] and motivates this research into diffusion provenance detection. To date, existing works on diffusion provenance detection have focused on offline detection, where a snapshot of a large network or data harvested from detectors is assumed to be available in advance. In order to design an online detection algorithm, three technical questions need to be answered: 1) how to design stochastic propagation models, 2) how to design an objective function for online detection, and 3) how to design an online algorithm as the solution. We surveyed related work in the three contexts.
In terms of stochastic propagation models for diffusion provenance location, existing works simulate the spread by using infection models such as the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) [8] model, the Susceptible-Infected SI [7] model, and others [11, 12] . Conversely, the recent works [13] [14] [15] have claimed that modeling propagation cascades and information diffusion using continuoustime diffusion networks can provide accurate models.
Several learning models based on the stochastic models were proposed to infer provenances. For example, a recent work [7] provided a systematic survey for locating the provenance of rumor in a network, and presented a rumor centrality estimator to estimate the rumor provenances by assigning a score to each infected node. The work [16] studied the problem of a single rumor provenance locating with a priori knowledge . Most existing estimators are based on either topological centrality measures [17] or distance measures between the observed data. Then, a maximum likelihood estimator can be used to infer the provenances.
One limitation of the above works is that they all assume that the infection status of the nodes (i.e., labels) is known beforehand. For example, the works [4, 7] considered the multiple infection provenances estimation problem and assumed that the number of infection provenances is unknown in advance. Some work [6] assumed that not all nodes are infected and only a subset of detectors are used for the provenance estimation.
In online algorithms, online learning has been extensively studied in machine learning. Typical methods include the PassiveAggressive (PA) [18] and truncated gradient algorithms [19] . However, these online learning algorithms are based on linear and convex optimization, which do not fit our non-convex online learning problem.
Despite the complexity of inferring the diffusion provenances in a network, a simple heuristic is to say that the provenance is the center of the network [20] . There are many notions of network centrality, but a very common one is known as distance centrality, e.g., betweenness centrality [21] , closeness centrality [22] and Bonacich centrality [23] . Betweenness centrality measures a node's centrality in a network. The infection closeness centrality heuristic claims the node with the maximum infection closeness is the source. Bonacich Centrality is a measure of the influence of a node in a network. One may argue that the most influential nodes are more likely to be the provenances of the diffusion. However, actually, an almost isolated node that has few connections to the most influential nodes is probably the source. Therefore, traditional central-based algorithms are hardly applicable.
To sum up, none of the aforementioned works can be directly used to address the online diffusion provenance detection problem studied in this work.
Preliminaries
Consider a network G = { V, E} , where the vertex set V has N nodes, and the edge set E has L edges. In the network, we have two types of data for model training: 
where t m is the activated time point of detector d m and label t m − t * denotes the time delay. Note that time labels of inactivated nodes are unknown, and their time delay exceeds window T .
We adopt an SI propagation model to describe how the infection spreads in network G. The reasons for using this kind of propagation model are that most posts on social networks are usually not removed, i.e., an infected node stays infected. Thus, SI is an appropriate model for online postings and modeling opinion dynamics on social networks. In the SI model, each node in a network has three possible states: susceptible (s), infected (I) and non-susceptible (n). As the infected nodes are those nodes that possess the infection, and will remain infected throughout, an infected detector cannot be recovered. Therefore, a detector cannot receive the same information multiple times and will not send the same information multiple times to the same node. Now we infer the edge transmission probability matrix W based on the cascades collected offline. Given a cascade c t ∈ C , we use f ( c t | W ) to denote the likelihood function of observing the cascade c t under an unknown transmission matrix W . The likelihood function consists of the joint probability of activated nodes v i ∈ V ( t i ≤ T ) and inactivated nodes v m ∈ V ( t m > T ). For an activated node v i ∈ V activated at time t i ≤ T from an adjacent node v j ∈ V and t j < t i , the probability of observing v i activated by v j at time t i is a joint probability of v j infecting v i at time t i and v i is not activated by any other neighbor v k which has been already activated by the time t i , i.e., t k < t i . By summing up all the possible neighbors v j in the network, i.e., summing up all v j with t j < t i , we can achieve the probability f (c
( 1) where g(v i ) denotes the set of neighbors to v i , and P ( t j → t i | W ) denotes the probability of the j th activated node v j activates its neighbor v i at time t i . We can use three well-known parametric functions for P ( t j → t i | W ), such as the widely used exponential , powerlaw and Rayleigh models [13] . Without loss of generality, we use the exponential model, where
Based on Eq. (1) , the probability of observing all the activated nodes in a cascade c t is as follows,
Because inactivated nodes also provide information for transmission weight estimation, the probability of observing an entire cascade c t , f ( c t | W ), is the joint probability of observing all the activated nodes in the cascade c t and discarding the remaining inactivated nodes as in Eq. (3) ,
The likelihood function of observing all cascades C is the product of all the likelihoods of each cascade given in Eq. (3) , (4) Then, the edge transmission matrix W can be estimated as follows,
The likelihood in Eq. (6) is convex, and thus the first-order gradient guarantees a global optimum. By letting the derivative of Eq. (6) to 0, we obtain φ (W ji ) = 0 for each cascade. That is,
. Moreover, we set the default propagation probability of each edge to be W ji = 1 T in case we don't observe any propagation data between nodes v j and v i in a cascade. Then, by averaging over | C | cascades, we obtain the final result as follows,
where
is an indicator and equals to 1 if the cascade c t satisfies the time constraint. κ is the total number of node pairs that meet the constraint. If the given time constraints are not met, the default weigth W ji is 1/ T .
Regression model
In this section, we formulate the objective function for diffusion provenances detection based on online data collected from the detectors . We assume that the prior distribution of s * is uniform over the network, i.e., any node in the network is equally likely to be the provenance. Thus, the location of the provenances can be recovered by maximizing the likelihood function of the observed status of the detectors D given provenances s ∈ G , as shown in Eq. (8) ,
where P ( D a | s ) denotes the probability of observing D a given a set of spread provenances s , and
denotes the joint probability of both observing the activated nodes D a and inactivated nodes D u . Because malicious information is often spread under the snowball phenomenon [24] , it is reasonable to approximate the shortestpath spread, denoted by
Because the offline obtained edge transmission matrix W may suffer unstable change when used online, we further use a random variable θ i , j to describe delays in time along edge e i ∈ E .
The random variables are independent and identically distributed
) , where the mean μ i , j are from matrix W . Fig. 3 shows an example of the Gaussian time delay and the shortest-path propagation. In the worst case, the search for the shortest path takes time O ( N 2 ).
Thus, the probability P ( D a | s ) in Eq. (8) can be rewritten as follows,
where m a is the number of observers during the time window, and 
Similarly, for unobservers, let Thus, Eq. (8) can be rewritten as
Let all time delays share the same variance σ 2 , then the loglikelihood function in Eq. (12) is
where C is a constant, t a (u ) − t * is the observed (unobserved) time delay. Thus, maximizing the log-likelihood 2 in Eq. (13) is tantamount to minimizing a quadratic regression function in Eq. (14) , where the target vector t ∈ R m a is the observed time delay, i.e., t a − t * for detector d a , the coefficient matrix 
The above formulation relaxes traditional discrete optimization on graphs. Such a relaxation leads to efficient algorithms. Now we intuitively explain the above problem from the viewpoint of multi-criteria quadratic programming . The first objective function, t − A T x 2 2 , aims to fit time delay of activated detectors D a , the second objective function T − B T x 2 2 aims to fit time delay of inactivated detectors D u . Because D u is not actually activated during the time window T , a negative parameter −λ < 0 is used to avoid the fitting. The trade-off Pareto solutions can be obtained by varying parameter λ.
Online algorithm
In this section, we present an Online Stochastic Sub-gradient algorithm to solve the regression model in Eq. (14) . The proposed regression model, compared to the classical regression learning, has several new challenges: 1) the dependent variable t is implicit, because the initial propagation time is unknown, 2) the l 1 nonconvex objective function expects sparse and fast convergent algorithm, and data collected from detectors arrive continuously. To
2 , where t a − t * is the observed time delay, and the same goes to inactivated
solve the challenges, we use the Relative Time Difference of Arrivals and Online Sub-gradient based on convex approximation as the solution.
Relative time difference
The dependent variable t in Eq. (14) is implicit, because the initial propagation time t * is unknown. To solve this challenge, we can use an "anchor node" to cancel out the initial time t * .
Assume the αth detector d α is the "anchor node", its activated time is t α = t 
Convex approximation
To address the non-convex challenge, we wish to find a sequence of convex programs, through which the non-convex function can be approximated and converge to a local minimum. To obtain a convergent sequence, at step k + 1 , the concave part −λ B T x 2 2 is linearly approximated by using the differential at the previous iterative point x k , i.e.,
At step k + 1 , we only solve a convex optimization as follows: 
. Adding both sides of the above two inequalities, we obtain the result J(x k +1 ) ≤ J(x k ) . Therefore, Eq. (16) under the sequence { x 1 , , x k , } generated by Eq. (18) is convergent.
Online sub-gradient
We use the sub-gradient method to solve the l 1 regularization problem in Eq. (16) 
which is an approximation of the first two parts in Eq. (16) by using the CCCP programming [25] at the concave part
. The sub-gradient of J is as follows, 
where sign (
These conditions can be used to define a sub-gradient for each
Thus, based on the three solutions, the sub-gradient method uses iterations:
where the parameter η t > 0 is the learning rate. In our analysis, we only consider constant learning rate with a fixed η t > 0.
The online stochastic sub-gradient (OSS) algorithm
In this section, we design an Online Stochastic Sub-gradient detection algorithm to continuously infer the diffusion provenances. Algorithm 1 summarizes the solution to Eq. (16) , where the sparse non-convex regression is solved by iteratively calculating the convex program in Eq. (18) and the non-smooth l 1 program in Eq. (19) . In terms of online learning, we use stochastic sub-gradient iterations to calculate j J (x ) during the time window T , i.e.,
As shown in Algorithm 1 , the proposed online algorithm calls two functions for continuous learning. Function 1 corresponds to the online computation within the time window T where the detectors are activated one by one. Function 2 corresponds to the one-time computation after the time window T . The corresponding overall framework can be found in Fig. 4 .
Based on the input of the proposed algorithm and the overall framework in Fig. 4 , there are some assumptions in the OSS algorithm. 1) At least 1 detector needs to be activated during the time window. We used the time delay of both activated detectors (matrix A and D a ) and inactivated detectors (matrix B and D u ) in the proposed algorithm. During the time window, Function 1 is only called for activated detectors, and each is activated sequentially. After the time window, Function 2 is called because data from both the activated and inactivated detectors is available. Therefore,
Algorithm 1
The online detection algorithm.
Input:
G: Network Graph;
: Stop criteria; Output: anchor (D a (u ) ) ; // randomly pick anchors 2: if t < T then 3: for each d i ∈ D a do 4: for each v j ∈ V do 5: 
if i > α then 9: for each k ≤ m a do 10: Output:
x k ← x k +1 ;
6:
8:
end for 10: until x k +1 − x k 11: X * ← x k +1 in a descending order; 12: j * = arg max
the proposed algorithm can be used to infer diffusion provenances when there is at least one activated detector ( i.e., the activated detector set D a is non-null and Function 1 can be called).
2) The network structure is known prior, i.e., the network graph G, the propagation mean is μ and variance is σ . 
Function 2 Online detecting after the time window.

Input:
A : Observation matrix; B : Unobservation matrix; t : Time delay; : Stop criteria;
η t : Learning rate;
Output:
The indicator vector X * ;
1: x k +1 ← a best guess; 2: repeat 3:
4:
Function 1 : During the time window T , detectors are activated sequentially. To conduct continuous detection, once a detector is activated, the regression learning model is used for provenance estimation. At this stage, data from the inactivated nodes is unavailable, the parameter λ in Eq. (16) equals 0, i.e.,
Each row of A and t in Eq. (23) denotes the shortest path and time delay from an observed detector to other detectors. By choosing an anchor node, Eq. (15) is used to calculate the matrix A and t in Eq. (23) . Due to the increasing of the number of activated detectors, matrix A and t in Eq. (23) increase dynamically.
Function 2 : After the time window T , data from both the activated and inactivated nodes is available. Thus, we can use Eq. (16) to locate the diffusion provenances. T . Detectors S 3 and S 5 are inactivated during time window T . We only consider eight nodes { S 0 , , S 7 }. We use Fig. 4 to show the procedure of the online learning: (1) During the time window T , the detectors are activated one by one. Once a detector is activated, we use Function 1 to estimate the provenance; (2) After the time window, we obtain all the activated detectors and inactivated detectors, and Function 2 can be used for detection.
Example: Consider a network in Fig. 5 . Assume t * = 1 , D = 3 , and the time window T is [1, 5] . Also, we assume detectors S 1 , S 3 and S 5 are observed at time t 1 = 1 , t 3 = 3 and t 5 = 5 respectively. Let S 1 be the anchor node. At t = 1 , we have A = [1 , 0 , 1 , 2 , 4 , 4 , 2 , 4] T . Then, at t = 3 , S 3 is activated, and we update the matrix A and t as follows, A = 1 0 1 2 4 4 2 4 1 2 2 0 2 2 2 2
The A and t are used to calculate A and t by Eq. (12) ,
At the last step, t = 5 and S 5 is observed. The variables A and t are continuously updated to 
The corresponding online solutions of x approximate the offline optimal solution when the time window T ends. We will leave the competitive boundary analysis in the future work. We have used Fig. 5 to show how to calculate matrix A , B and t in the above example. Fig. 5 shows the shortest path from nodes { S 0 , , S 7 } to anchor node S 1 . For example, the elements value in matrix A are based on calculating shortest path to S 1 in Fig. 5 .
Experiments
In this section, we report experimental results on two synthetic network datasets and two real-world datasets. The experiments are designed to validate (1) the optimal parameters for the new model, (2) the superiority of the proposed model compared with benchmark methods, and (3) the performance of the proposed methods.
Experimental data
We use two synthetic datasets ( Albert-Barabasi [26] and Small World [27] ) and two real-world datasets ( Twitter and Facebook from SNAP 3 ) for parameter study, performance testing and algorithm comparison. The parameter settings are listed in Table 1 .
Albert-Barabasi generates random scale-free networks using a preferential attachment mechanism. The network begins with an initially connected network containing β 0 nodes. New nodes are added to the network one at a time. Each new node is connected to β ≤ β 0 existing nodes with a probability proportional to the number of links that existing nodes already have. Formally, the probability p i that the new node is connected to node i is p i = k i j k j , where k i is the degree of node i and the sum is made over all pre-existing nodes j . In this model, we set the parameter n = 4 , which denotes the number of edges created by each new node.
Small World is defined as a network in which the typical distance ζ between two randomly chosen nodes (the number of steps required) grows proportionally to the logarithm of the number of nodes N in the network, that is ζ ∝ log N . We use parameter α to denote that each node is connected to α nearest neighbors in the topology, and p denotes the rewiring probability. In particular, we set al pha = 4 and p = 0 . 1 in our experiments. The original datasets only contain network structure information without time propagation labels. We use Gaussian distribution N (1, 0.001) as the time delay distribution. We simulated the propagation by randomly setting five diffusion sources.
We used the Independent Cascade Model to generate cascades. When node u becomes active, it has a single chance of activating each currently inactive neighbor v . The attempt to activate succeeds independently with a probability of p u v , set to p u v = 0 . 5 as a constant in our experimental setting. Because the cascades are 3 http://snap.stanford.edu/data . generated by the Independent Cascade Model, each node has a single chance of activating each currently inactive neighbor, so this is one-to-one communication. Thus, the datasets can be considered as half-real data.
Experimental setup
We assess our methods w.r.t the average distance (hops) between actual locations of the diffusion provenances and the estimated locations. Smaller hops indicate that the algorithms have higher accuracy. Let S * denote the actual provenance, and the estimated provenance set as ˆ S . Since the size of S * may not be equal to that of ˆ S , we measure their distance h (S * , ˆ S ) by calculating the average number of hops between each element 
Experimental results
Parameter study . We first test the parameters in Eq. (16) The number of diffusion provenances k . From Fig. 6 (a) , we can see that the error rate (hops) decreases w.r.t. the number of diffusion provenances. We can conclude that the more diffusion provenances, the higher probability that at least one provenance will be found.
The number of detectors m . Fig. 6 (b) shows the average distance (hops) w.r.t the number of detectors. The result demonstrates that the accuracy improves w.r.t the number of detectors.
The monitoring time window T . The monitoring time window indicates the detection time span. Fig. 6 (c) shows that the error hops drop with the time window.
The parameter λ. The parameter λ controls the preference between the activated nodes (convex part) and the inactivated nodes (concave part). As shown in Fig. 6 (d) , the parameter λ should weigh the convex part and the concave part. If λ is selected too large, it overfits the inactivated nodes; otherwise, it overfits the activated nodes.
The parameter ρ. ρ > 0 is the regularization parameter, and restricts the size of x . If ρ is too large, the algorithm incurs time costs, especially on large networks. From Fig. 6 (e) , we observe the minimal hops when ρ is 6.
Continuous detection . We test the proposed online algorithm on both the synthetic and real-world datasets. Also, we empirically study the learning rate parameter η t in the sub-gradient algorithm. Comparison with benchmark methods . We compare the proposed non-convex sparse regression model (NSR) with three benchmark methods: 1) the convex-based sparse regression method (VEXR) [28] , which uses activated nodes for regression and locating; 2) the concave-based sparse regression method (CAVR) [28] , which uses inactivated nodes for regression; 3) Betweenness centrality [21] , which measures a node's centrality in a network. We use betweenness centrality to measure how often a node appears on the shortest path. The betweenness centrality of a node v is given by the function:
, where σ st is the total number of the shortest paths from node s to node t and σ st (v ) is the number of those paths that pass through v ; and 4)
Bonacich centrality [23] , also known as Eigenvector Centrality, measures the influence of a node in a network. The influence of nodes is based on assigning relative scores to all nodes in the network. The centrality score of node v is defined as: We compare the four methods on the two synthetic networks and two real-world networks. The parameters are set as default. We test two settings, the number of diffusion provenances k = 5 and k = 10 on the four synthetic datasets. For each group, we randomly sample different numbers of detectors m . From the results in Table 2 , the results can be summarised as follows.
(1) The proposed NSR model performs better than both CVXR and CAVR models on most of the datasets, by leveraging both activated and inactivated nodes and achieves the lowest expected hops, especially when m is large. For example, on the ForestFire dataset, NSR achieves the best result of 1.33 hops when k = 10 and m = 0 . 2 * N. (2) The NSR model performs better than the heuristic Betweenness model when the sample rate m / N is high. This is because the betweenness algorithm aims to find the central nodes in a network, and it cannot make proper use of information from detectors. However, when the sample rate is low, betweenness shows better results than the other three. (3) When the number of detectors increases, the error rates of NSR, CVXR and CAVR reduce significantly -NSR reduces the most. The stability of the betweeness model is poor. (4) The NSR model outperforms the other benchmarks in most cases, because centrality finds the most influential nodes in a social network. However, sometimes the source may not be among the most influential nodes. For example, malicious information may be misforwarded by one user from and then spread by other influential users. That is, centrality approaches tend to discover key infrastructure nodes or super-spreaders but do not necessarily pinpoint the diffusions source. By leveraging both activated and inactivated nodes, NSR can achieve better results than VEXR (which only uses activated nodes) and CAVR (which only uses inactivated nodes). (5) The accuracy of centrality increased with an increased the number of sources, because centrality finds the most influential nodes in a social network. However, sometimes the source may not be among the most influential nodes. For example, malicious information may be misforwarded by one user and then spread by the other influential users. That is, centrality approaches tend to discover key infrastructure nodes or super-spreaders, but do not necessarily pinpoint the diffusion's source. The accuracy increase is because the more provenances there are, the greater the probability that the influential nodes are provenances. (6) The NSR model performs better than other baselines especially when m is large. This is because that NSR carries out estimating provenances with more detectors (activated and inactivated), where more information for the regression model can be provided.
Comparison fo the online algorithm with different propagation processes . We evaluate our algorithm using various propagation processes, i.e. , Independent Cascades propagation shown in Fig. 8 (a) and Linear Threshold propagation shown in Fig. 8 (b) . For the former, the corresponding description can be found in Online algorithm time cost . Fig. 9 plots the average running time of the algorithm OSS on the synthetic and real-world datasets. The running time raises moderately at the beginning due to the increase of activated nodes ( Function 1 ), and then increases sharply in the end because all the activated and inactivated detectors are used for calculation ( Function 2 ).
Conclusions
This paper discusses a solution for discovering the diffusion provenances in social networks in an online setting. We proposed a real-time source detection algorithm by placing detectors randomly across a network. Our approach converts the problem to a regression problem, and uses an online stochastic sub-gradient algorithm to solve regression as the information is gathered from detectors in real time. This work focuses on online detection rather than offline, to meet the practical need for early warning, realtime awareness and real-time responses to malicious information spreading within an online social network. This work can therefore be used in time-critical security monitoring applications, such as locating false rumors in business areas.
Although our algorithm for detecting the diffusion provenances detection achieves high accuracy and meets the need for a realtime response, some limitations exist that need improvement in future work: 1) the simulation study used real network data but the propagation process was synthetic, dubbed half-real data, so experiments on real network propagation data need to be undertaken; and 2) the proposed algorithm, based on sub-gradients, is a straightforward solution for online learning problems, however more state-of-the-art online learning algorithms could be applied to this online diffusion provenance problem, such as passiveaggressive (PA), second-order perceptron (SOP) and confidenceweight learning (CW).
This work inspires some interesting directions for future research: 1) the problem could be further extended by using popular stochastic epidemic models such as the SR and SRI models; and 2) previous mobile social network mining techniques could be used to harness geographical information to identify a culprit's physical location.
